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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis addresses the ever increasing threat of botnets in the smartphone 
domain and focuses on the Android platform and the botnets using Online Social 
Networks (OSNs) as Command and Control (C&C) medium. With any botnet, C&C 
is one of the components on which the survival of botnet depends. Individual bots use 
the C&C channel to receive commands and send the data.  This thesis develops active 
host based approach for identifying the presence of bot based on the anomalies in the 
usage patterns of the user before and after the bot is installed on the user smartphone 
and alerting the user to the presence of the bot. A profile is constructed for each user 
based on the regular web usage patterns (achieved by intercepting the http(s) traffic) 
and implementing machine learning techniques to continuously learn the user’s 
behavior and changes in the behavior and all the while looking for any anomalies in 
the user behavior above a threshold which will cause the user to be notified of the 
anomalous traffic.  
A prototype bot which uses OSN s as C&C channel is constructed and used 
for testing. Users are given smartphones(Nexus 4 and Galaxy Nexus) running 
Application proxy which intercepts http(s) traffic and relay it to a server which uses 
the traffic and constructs the model for a particular user and  look for any signs of 
anomalies. This approach lays the groundwork for the future host-based counter 
measures for smartphone botnets using OSN s as C&C channel. 
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Motivation 
 
Current day to day operations of individuals and enterprises heavily rely on the 
individual owned smart devices (smart phones and tablets). This growing reliance on smart 
devices (owing partly to BYOD trend) results in storage of confidential data on the smart 
devices. While the sensitivity of the data being stored in the smart devices is increasing at 
alarming rate, user awareness of security in the smart devices is not increasing in 
comparable rate. The rate of penetration of these smartphones is making these devices a 
lucrative target for cyber criminals. To put things into perspective, as of August 2013 there 
are 1.39 billion smartphone users with Android claiming 58 % market share and 84 % of 
users use smartphones to browse internet exposing them to nefarious hackers. Smart 
devices are treasure trove for malicious hackers who pilfer the smart devices for valuable 
data (both private and enterprise). 
 One of the important tools for this pilfering in malicious hacker’s arsenal is botnet.  
Botnet consists of bots which receives commands through Command and Control channel, 
executes them and in some cases upload the data back through the same channels. Botnets 
differ from other classes of malware in the area of tasks performed by the malware. Almost 
all other classes of malware will be preprogrammed to do specific task(s) at specific time. 
Botnets can perform a variety of tasks based on the commands received and control they 
have over the host. This research fits into mobile security domain specifically focusing on 
the host based detection of bots. 
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1.2 Problem Statement 
 
Botnets are one of the major problems being encountered today by the cyber community. 
This is due to huge number of infected machines and the diversity of tasks they can be 
commanded to use. Another major problem is the difficulty to pinpoint the source of attack 
which might help the defenders to organize a counter attack. Botnets have been the cause 
of spam, DDOS attacks as well as the illegal information collection. Sheer number of 
smartphones and their ubiquitous connectivity to the internet have made the current day 
smartphones particular target for the botnet masters.  Many researchers tried to address the 
problem of detecting and disassembling botnets by detecting the botnet traffic among the 
general network traffic at ISP level or network level [2,3,4] and eventually identifying and 
targeting the command and control (C&C) servers operating a particular botnet. This 
approach leads to destruction of botnet but leaves the bots and the information collected by 
bot on each device intact to be exploited in the future. Some researchers considered a 
scenario in which C&C servers cannot be taken down even when the botnet traffic is 
identified. The scenario is as follows: Suppose the bot master (one who is behind the 
botnet) decided to leverage the Online Social Networks (OSNs) as the C&C channel. Since 
the OSNs cannot be taken down, even if the botnet traffic is detected at the ISP, the C&C 
channel cannot be broken. Leveraging OSNs as C&C channel might simply involve 
creating a user and posting a tweet (in case of Twitter) or a post (in case of Facebook). So, 
even if the user is deleted by the authorities, the bot master will simply create another user.  
This scenario can be only handled when the detection of bot is done at the host level so that 
user can be notified of its existence and take remedial actions. More research is required to 
study and develop the measures for detection of bots at host level. 
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1.3 Research Objectives 
The Command and Control component is vital for existence of any botnet because it is the 
component that connects the bot master with the bots. Bot master needs to design a 
resilient, secure and robust way to stay connected with the bot. This results in bot master 
leveraging the Online Social Networks as the Command and Control channel. This author 
is unaware of any host based detection methods for detecting the advanced bots that leverage 
OSNs as the C&C channel at the time of this writing. This thesis aims to provide a ground work for 
detecting the bots using OSNs as C&C in the smartphones. The research goals are as follows: 
 Design a mechanism to detect potential C&C channel selection and communication  and bot 
presence and alert the user to the same 
 Implement the mechanism as a proof of concept on Android platform 
 Validate the proof of concept using a prototype of advanced android bot 
 
1.4 Approach 
The goals of this research are attained by developing a classifier that takes the user web 
data as input and create a model based on the user web behavior. This classifier further 
classifies the incoming data as regular usage or anomaly based on the model developed. If 
an anomaly is discovered, then user is notified of the anomaly and is expected to take 
remedial action. The classifier implemented is Kernel Logistic Regression. The bot 
prototype implemented is similar to “mini-duke” bot in terms of Command & Control 
which leverages OSN s. This bot prototype is implemented on Android platform. The user 
data belongs to the users operating a Nexus 4 and a Galaxy Nexus smartphones. Fiddler is 
used as the application proxy to intercept the data. Daily web usage of these two users is 
captured by the server. After preprocessing it, the resultant data is submitted to the 
classifier. 
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1.5 Assumptions and Limitations 
 
 
Several key assumptions and limitations were accepted in realizing the goals. The 
assumptions are: 
 Smartphone is not infected during the first 15 days of usage (training phase). 
 Adversary does not have knowledge of this system 
 OSNs are the only channel for Command & Control 
 Successful vectors exist for infecting a smartphone with a bot 
 The limitations are as follows: 
 The system only provides awareness regarding the existence of bot in the smart 
phone but does not provide eradication mechanism 
 The proxy is implemented as Application proxy based on inserting a root certificate 
in the system trusted store of certificates. Due to this, in depth analysis of traffic 
belonging to applications which use certificate pinning is difficult. But there are 
very few apps that use certificate pinning. 
 The external server is assumed to be a trusted server 
 
1.6 .Organization 
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 is a literature review summarizing 
the botnet phenomenon giving overview of botnets, various types of botnets based on 
Command and Control mechanisms, various botnet and bot detection methods already 
proposed. In Chapter 3, we discuss advanced botnets in the smartphone platform and briefly 
discuss about the next generation botnets. Chapter 4 includes the implementation details of 
the next generation bots and our proof of concept of bot. Chapter 5 presents our detection 
system, the implementation details and system evaluation results. Chapter 6 summarizes 
the research, discusses advanced bots in smartphones and suggest areas for extended and 
future research regarding the detection of these advanced bots. 
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Chapter 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
In this chapter, we provide a background for different components involved in the proposed 
host based mechanism to detect the bot that leverages OSN s as the Command & Control 
channel. First, the functioning of botnets is discussed to understand how they work and 
then various Command & Control mechanisms used over the time and the counter 
techniques developed by the researchers to mitigate the botnets are discussed. Next, an 
explanation of advanced botnet leveraging the Online Social Networks is provided. 
 
2.1 Overview of Botnets 
 
Botnets are one of the widely used malware to inflict various damages on the cyber 
community like DDOS attacks, spam, spamdexing, click fraud and very recently mining 
bit coins. The following section describe botnets. 
Definition & Components 
 
A bot is defined as a script/code designed to automate some predefined functions. A 
spider/crawler used by search engines can be termed as a bot because it is designed to 
automate the functionality of crawling the web and indexing the pages along the way. Bots 
are used to do automated tasks such as training the game personas in an automated way 
without human intervention and thus are very useful to save a lot of time. In the time of 
IRC networks, these bots were used to automate some administrator functions. It was in 
these IRC networks that bots were first modified to create a network by linking one bot to 
other leading to botnet. 
In modern days, the term “bot” is being used to refer to malware residing in a computer 
awaiting commands from the bot master (designer of botnet). It is different from other 
malware because it is not waiting to be executed (virus) or spreading to other machines 
(worm) but it allows attacker to take full control of the machine. It is also different from 
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other classes of malware in terms of functions it is deigned to perform. While others have 
predefined functionality and corresponding code in them, bot can execute a variety of 
commands as specified by the bot master and thus can wreak a havoc when compared to 
other classes of malware. Since, it is dynamic in the sense of executing instructions, it is 
very difficult to identify them based on the functioning.   A botnet is collection of bots 
controlled by an attacker or a group of attackers with ability to communicate and execute 
commands. 
The bot master needs a mechanism to communicate with the botnet to specify the 
commands bot needs to execute in their host machines and to send any data to the bot 
master. This mechanism is known as Command and Control channel (C&C). C&C 
channel is one of the most vital component in a botnet because it is the only means 
connecting the bot master and the bots. Design and characteristics of this C&C channel 
determine the resiliency, stealth and robustness of the botnet.  
Botnet Lifecycle 
 
 Lifecycle of Botnets consists of four phases [5]. 1. Spread 2. Infection 3. Command & 
Control 4. Attack. Bot master first delivers the malware payload to target machines which 
then infects the machine. The Command & Control phase begins after the machine has 
been infected. The attack phase will start after the bot masters has a large enough number 
of bots under his control.  Let us discuss each of these phases in detail.  
Spread: Bots can spread through various means such as phishing emails, compromised 
websites, worms and malicious pages links sent by spam. Phishing emails are emails 
designed to look like generic emails with embedded html links in them which point to 
malicious websites or with a downloadable file like pdf, doc, docx etc., When user 
downloads and opens these files, the files utilize the vulnerabilities of the software to 
perform malicious tasks. Worms are malware which are programmed to propagate to other 
machines either by finding vulnerable accounts on the networks or vulnerable operating 
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systems. The modern day vectors of botnet spread particularly in the case of smartphones 
are malicious apps from third-party application market places and drive by downloads. The 
main purpose of this phase is to just deliver the payload that eventually will infect the 
machine. This infection might be done by unwitting users executing the malware or the 
malware exploiting the system or software vulnerabilities. There is a huge delay in delivery 
of security patches to the Android smartphones by the OEMs and the network carriers. This 
delay from the time of discovery of a vulnerability to the time of issuance of a patch is a 
powerful motivation for the attackers to attack the Android platform.  
Infection: Once the payload is delivered to the target machine, the malware uses various 
methods to infect the machine. The purpose of this phase is to infect the machine and 
maintain a presence inside the machine without attracting any attention. In order to achieve 
this, the malware uses a wide range of techniques like disabling the anti-malware tools, 
Polymorphism, Code hardening and root-kitting. 
Polymorphism: Anti-virus engines normally keep track of the viruses by maintaining virus 
signature database containing information such as name, code size and code hash. In order 
to fool the Anti-malware engines, the malware changes its code with each infection. This 
makes it harder for the malware engines to detect the code.  
Code hardening: In order to prevent reverse engineering of the bot which might result in 
revealing the Command & Control channel to others, bots are being designed today to 
withstand reverse engineering. In order to achieve this, bot masters are using techniques 
like code obfuscation, encryption and encoding to prevent it from being analyzed.  
Rootkits: Rootkits are the most powerful of all these methods because the rootkits are 
installed with root privileges. Since rootkits are installed with root privileges, they can hide 
all their activities from the Operating System and thus from the anti-malware engines.  
Command & Control: Command & Control phase involves bot communicating with the 
bot master and receive further commands to be executed on the target machines. The 
communication between the bots and bot master is done through Command & Control 
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servers. These servers will issue commands and in some cases receive any data uploaded 
by the bots as instructed. There are various protocols which are in use by these Command 
& Control servers and the botnets some times are classified according to the type of 
protocol used. We will describe the types of botnets in following sections but for now we 
will discuss the types of protocols in use.   
IRC: In the initial stages, Internet Relay Chat (IRC) has been the most common protocol 
which has been used for Command & Control. Each bot connects to the IRC server 
mentioned in the body of the bot and awaits commands from the bot master on certain 
channel in a PUSH style. The disadvantage with this method is that taking down the IRC 
server or channel will result in dissolution of botnet.
  
 
2.1 Bot communication over IRC channel 
 
HTTP: One of the ways of detecting the Command & Control traffic is by observing the 
open ports in the system and amount of IRC traffic or any other anomalous protocol traffic. 
In order to have a stealthy C&C channel, bot masters started leveraging the popular HTTP 
protocol which is used to render the internet pages. Since almost all computers connected 
to internet have HTTP traffic, detecting the C&C traffic in HTTP traffic is difficult. Instead 
of being conspicuous by connecting to several HTTP servers and remaining in connected 
mode and leading to lot of connected ports in the machine which might raise any red flags, 
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the HTTP bots employed PULL style in which the bots periodically visit certain web 
servers in order to get new commands or upload any data. This mode of communication 
will be inconspicuous. This protocol also suffers from central point of failure. If anyone 
were to decode the servers that were being used as C&C servers, taking down those servers 
will result in successful disruption of botnet. But there are several advantages by using this 
protocol as well. Since HTTP traffic is used to mask the C&C traffic, IDS and firewalls 
will have difficult time spotting it. While it is possible to detect the C&C traffic through 
whitelisting or blacklisting the websites, it gets even more difficult to stop these kind of 
botnets if the HTTP servers were actually compromised trusted servers. 
  
  2.2 Bot communication over HTTP protocol 
 
Short Message Service: Advent of smartphones have introduced Short Message Service as 
one of the C&C channels. This is due to the fact that the smartphones are programmable. 
Even though SMS can be leveraged as C&C channel in feature phones, the bot in the 
feature phone will have a very limited use such as sending SMS to premium numbers. But, 
When SMS is leveraged as C&C channel in smartphones, it can serve as a powerful 
alternative to above mentioned protocols.  
Attack: When the bot master has established Command & Control over the sufficient 
number of bots, he is ready to utilize the full potential of bots under his command. 
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Traditionally, botnets have been used to send spam, phishing mails and perform click fraud 
as well as massive Distributed Denial of Service (DDOS) attacks against variety of targets 
such as banking and government networks. Phishing mails will further increase the size of 
the botnet. Click fraud will result in poisoning of Search Engine results which in turn will 
cause users to be redirected to malicious sites. DDOS attacks are one of the most expensive 
cyber-attacks. A DDOS attacks will result in huge monetary and strategic loss and is 
equally costly to defend. Some botnets perform brute force login attempts on vulnerable 
network accounts leading to Identity theft and further compromise of the networks. 
 
2.2 Taxonomy of Botnets 
Botnets are classified on the basis of the architecture used by the bot master to control the 
botnet. There are traditionally two types of botnets [6]. They are as follows:  
 Centralized botnets and 
 Peer-to-peer botnets 
Centralized botnets: In this type of botnets, Command & Control server(s) is (are) 
centralized. This central server waits for the bots to connect to it and then register the bot, 
updates them with the commands and keeps track of the status of each bot. The centralized 
server knows all the bots and is in contact with all the bots in the botnet.
 
 
 
 2.3 Centralized botnet architecture 
 
 
 
11 
 
 
 
Several advantages exists for botnets with this kind of architecture. It is easy to manage the 
botnets and commands are dispersed faster and easier. Designing this type of bot is also 
easier. One of the disadvantages of this architecture is its central point of failure. If bot is 
reverse engineered and the C&C servers are targeted, the botnet will be disrupted.  
Peer-to-peer botnets: In order to overcome the inherent disadvantage of the centralized 
botnets, peer-to-peer botnets are designed. In this architecture, each bot connects to other 
infected machines. Each bot is supplied with a list of machines it is supposed to be 
connected to. This bot is responsible for getting commands from one of them and 
transmitting them to rest of them. Bot master just needs to have control of one bot to control 
the botnet. Although disrupting this kind of botnets is difficult, designing and managing 
this kind of botnets is difficult for the bot master.  In order to make the design easier, the 
bot first contacts centralized server if present and gets a list of bots it is supposed to be 
connected to and then receives and disseminates the commands based on the peer-to-peer 
protocol. This will make the botnet resilient because there exists no central server in peer-
to-peer to deactivate. Some research has been done to explore mechanisms to identify and 
disrupt peer-to-peer botnets.  
 
 
2.4 Peer-to-peer botnet architecture 
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2.3 Botnet Defense Techniques 
Blacklisting: Blacklisting involves prohibiting the machines inside a network to connect 
to particular domain(s) or IP(s). Command & Control traffic of the botnet is monitored and 
all the domains and IP addresses it is connecting to are placed in black list. Each time a 
machine wants to initiate a connection, a look up is performed on the blacklist and if the 
domain or IP it is connecting to is present in the blacklist, the connection is terminated. If 
not, then the connection is allowed. This prevents the machines from contacting the known 
malicious domains which serve as C&C servers. This method is widely used to disrupt 
HTTP based botnets 
Port blocking:  This mechanism is widely used to block IRC botnets. Since bots operating 
IRC protocol should use a network socket to connect to the IRC servers, firewalls are 
programmed to block well know IRC ports. This will prevent the IRC bots from making 
connection to their C&C server.  
DNS sinkhole: DNS sink holing [7] cuts off the bots from communicating with Command 
and Control servers by utilizing the Domain Name Service (DNS). DNS is a service used 
to resolve the human readable names to IP addresses. DNS sinkhole works by spoofing the 
authoritative DNS servers for malicious hosts and domains. DNS sink holing involves 
configuring the DNS forwarder to return false IP addresses for known malicious hosts and 
domains. So, when a bot requests to resolve such host or domain, it is routed to a non-
existent address or a benign host from which the bot cannot retrieve any commands. This 
approach is particularly effective against centralized botnets due to the fact that there is a 
single point of failure. If the bots cannot resolve the host, then the C&C server does not 
have any means of disseminating the commands.  
Botnet infiltration: The above methods work fine for majority cases of centralized botnets 
and some minor peer-to-peer botnets. Botnet infiltration is one of the effective ways to 
disrupt peer-to-peer botnets. This involves exploiting the bootstrapping process of peer-to-
peer botnets. In order to connect and receive instructions initially, the bot (peer-to-peer or 
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centralized) must have some information on mechanisms to establish Command and 
Control channel and to download the instructions. This information might include IP 
addresses of bots to be connected to initially, protocols of communication and connection 
information. Peer-to-peer botnets are vulnerable to unauthenticated publish systems, any 
bot can publish commands and if the sufficient number of benign bots flood the botnet 
peer-to-peer network with benign commands, then they overwrite the bot master 
commands and thus succeed in disrupting the botnet.  
Index poisoning: Idea of index poisoning [8] is to introduce massive number of bogus 
records into the index so that if one of the peer receives a bogus record, the peer would not 
be able to locate the peer or connect to the wrong peer. If a bot is reverse engineered and 
bot command related index keys are compromised, then “Index-based” peer-to-peer 
botnets are vulnerable to this attack. Since there is no central authority to manage the file 
index, malicious nodes will be able to insert records into the index, and there is no way to 
authenticate the identity of the node and content of the records. 
Sybil defense: A Sybil attack [8] is the forging of multiple identities to subvert the 
reputation system upon which the peer-to-peer network is built. Peer-to-peer networks 
normally operate without any kind of authentication or validation and hence any peer can 
join the network. If index keys were compromised, Sybil nodes can be added to the botnet 
to re-route or monitor the command related traffic. 
 
2.4 Botnet Design Techniques 
In order to cope up with the techniques evolved into disrupting the botnets, bot masters 
have come up with variety of techniques to make botnet as resilient and as stealthy as 
possible. We discuss some of the techniques used by the bot master to design the botnet to 
be resilient. 
Fast Fluxing: 
Fast fluxing [9] is assigning multiple IP addresses to a domain name (like 
14 
 
 
 
www.xample.com). The IP addresses are assigned and de-assigned to the domain name 
very frequently using round robin algorithm. There are single flux networks and double 
flux networks in use. Single flux networks involve front end bots to which traffic is 
redirected to. If the end user browser likes to communicate with the www.xample.com, 
then actual communication will take place with one of the many infected hosts whose IP 
addresses are used in round robin fashion to be assigned to the DNS record of the domain 
www.xample.com. In some cases, these front end bots will communicate with the back end 
servers to deliver the commands or upload the data. This method will ensure the load 
distribution across the infected hosts. Double flux networks will involve the above 
mentioned approach with some changes. In the double flux networks, the DNS name server 
itself will be a part of the flux scheme with its IP address changing frequently. This name 
server will contact the back end servers to service the user query of the domain name and 
will deliver the IP address of an infected host which is a part of the single flux network.  
There are several advantages with the flux networks. One of them is that the front end hosts 
are disposable. A security researcher tracking the botnet might locate some of the infected 
hosts which are front end hosts involved in the fluxing. Thus, the backend server is 
protected by the layer of disposable front end hosts. Double flux networks increase the 
resilience of the botnet in the same method adding a extra layer of protection for the 
backend servers by involving the name servers in the flux scheme.  
Domain Generated Algorithm (DGA) based Botnets: 
Fast flux technique mentioned above can be otherwise call IP fluxing technique because 
IP addresses are fluxed to standard domain name. Domain Generation Algorithm (DGA) 
can be called as Domain fluxing technique. In this technique, the bot will have an algorithm 
which will take a seed value (like current system date and/or time) and output a list of 
random names. These random names will serve as domain names to which the bot will 
attempt a connection. Each bot will execute this DGA periodically and will try to resolve 
these domain names by sending DNS queries until one of them directs to a IP address of a 
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Command and Control server. This technique is remarkably resilient to botnet disruption 
techniques because it combines the advantages of Centralized and peer-to-peer botnets. 
Even if one or more Command and Control domains are identified and removed, the IP 
address of the Command and Control server can be assigned to one of the Domain names 
in the next set of domain names provided by the Domain Generation Algorithm. This 
technique has some disadvantages like it is time and cost consuming to register domain 
names to IP addresses of C&C servers every time a domain is taken down. And if the DGA 
in the bot is reverse engineered, then the past, current and future candidates of the DGA 
can be computed and blocked to cut off the communication from the bot to C&C servers. 
This can be made harder by techniques such as code-obfuscation and encryption. But the 
cost effectiveness is still an issue.  Some researchers have suggested a method of detecting 
DGA based malware without reverse engineering the bot. Since botnets employing this 
technique require bots to query DNS servers for valid domain names resolving to IP 
addresses of C&C servers, by monitoring the NXDomain traffic [10] (Non-existent 
Domains) which will result for the domains that does not resolve to any IP, the researchers 
aim to employ clustering algorithms to cluster the similar NXDomain traffic generated by 
bots of the botnet. 
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Chapter 3 
BOTNETS IN SMARTPHONES 
 
Traditionally bot masters leverages various vectors like Spam email, Phishing email, 
Viruses, Worms and malicious web pages as the vectors for the infections of hosts to 
become bots. However, as the smartphones evolve and the data being stored on the 
smartphone becomes sensitive and personal day by day, the malware writers have shifted 
their focus towards mobile platforms. There are various reasons for this phenomenon. One 
of them is that current day smartphones are not just personal devices, they are computing 
machines too. Current day smartphones pack a processor (more generally dual core), 
separate Graphics co-processor, at least 1 GB RAM and a variety of sensors (and a 
processor sometimes to monitor them, like motion co-processor in iPhone 5S). The variety 
of sensors in the current day smartphones provide a unique opportunity to malware writers 
that traditional computing platform was not able to provide.  
The sensors package in the current day smartphone has the ability to collect a variety of 
personal information like the locations visited by the user of the smartphone from which 
user location patterns can be deduced (GPS). The other sensors like accelerometer, 
gyroscope and magnetometer provide data that cannot be gathered from traditional 
computing system. The data from this sensor rich mobile computing platform made this 
platform a potential target for malware writers. Another main reason for this platform to 
become a target for malware writers is that its ubiquitous connectivity with the internet. 
Smartphones these days are connected to internet through wide variety of means such as 
3G/4G, Wi-Fi etc., 
Botnets for smartphones are lucrative for malware writers because of the ubiquitous 
connectivity, smartphone adoption rate, lack of central security authority and lax security 
policies being implemented in this nascent platform.  
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3.1 Infection vectors and Command & Control Channels in Smartphones 
The modes of connectivity of the smartphone has given rise to new infection vectors  as 
well as Command and Control channels in the smartphones such as Short Message Service 
(SMS), Bluetooth, Application market places, drive by downloads and MMS. Short 
Message Service is one of the most coveted channel as the infection vector and the 
Command and Control channel due to its ubiquitous nature. It is present by default in every 
phone and the SMSs are routed through the carrier internal network thus restricting its 
exposure to tracking and detection. Bluetooth is another new vector for infection and C&C 
channel. It is generally thought that Bluetooth is not ideal vector C&C channel due to its 
low range. But recent research conducted to evaluate the Bluetooth as C&C channel [11] 
in smartphones showed that due to regular habitual patterns followed by humans enable 
Bluetooth to be a good C&C channel. For example, if a smartphone user use subway at 9 
AM and 6 PM then the bot can send and receive commands from other neighbor bots from 
the co passengers of the subway at 9 AM and 6 PM.   Application market places also 
contribute to the infection of smartphones due to lack of inspection mechanism. Malware 
writers combine famous and functional apps with malware and upload them to application 
market places. Google Play store, Apple app store and Amazon app store are some of the 
major application markets for smartphone applications. Apple app store performs checking 
on apps for malicious features while Google Play store has recently employed static 
checking mechanism for apps submitted to it. While these mechanisms prevent some of 
the malicious apps to be uploaded to the app store, both these app stores are vulnerable to 
apps that contain malicious code in separate places and combine the code while running of 
the app. And many countries involves local application market places in which no checking 
is performed on the apps uploaded. These application market places will serve as main 
infection vectors along with drive by downloads. 
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3.2 Advanced Bots in Smartphones 
This section deals with advanced botnets [12] in smartphones in terms of infection vectors, 
resiliency, stealth, primary functionality and the sheer number of devices infected. 
Zeus in the Mobile: 
This is the mobile component of the famous Zeus botnet known for fraudulent banking 
transactions by collecting the user banking credentials. As the authentication mechanisms 
evolved, many organizations shifted to what is popularly called “two factor 
authentication” mechanism. This mechanism involves the knowledge of some 
information (password) and the possession of the something (in most cases, a registered 
mobile device to receive a code which should be inputted as second layer of 
authentication). This mechanism is based on fundamental security primitives of “what 
you know” and “what you have” which are building blocks of other authentication 
systems such as hardware tokens (RSA SecurId), dongles etc., The smartphone 
implementation of the system has an inherent flaw in it compared to the USB tokens. 
While the sole functionality of the hardware dongles is to provide the random 
authentication code to access the second layer, smartphones have various functionalities 
apart from that. So, when organizations started to utilize smartphones for two-factor 
authentication, the malware writers began targeting the smartphone platforms for the 
secondary authentication tokens being sent to the smartphones. The Zeus in the Mobile or 
Zitmo is developed for this purpose. It infects variety of mobile operating systems, such 
as Symbian, Windows Mobile, BlackBerry, and Android mainly by social engineering 
approaches. It sends an infected SMS to victims contain a fake URL to dupe users to 
download a security certificate which is, in fact, the Zitmo bot. It also intercepts 
messages which are sent by banks to customers and authenticates illegal transactions by 
stealing mobile Transaction Authentication Numbers (TAC). 
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AnserverBot: 
AnserverBot is considered one of the most sophisticated malware found in the 
smartphones.  Its sophistication lies in its Command and Control mechanism based on a 
two-layer mechanism and implemented over public blog. This mechanism makes it 
resilient to botnet takedown techniques and makes it harder to identify the botmaster who 
is covered by two layers. Its additional capabilities include detecting and disabling the 
security solutions in infected device which is normally an attribute of PC botnets. In 
order to prevent reverse engineering, the AnserverBot periodically checks its signature to 
verify its integrity in order to protect itself from any type of changes. 
DroidDream: 
DroidDream was one of a those kind of bots which can be termed intelligent, since it is 
activated silently and at night (11pm to 8 am) when the usage of the user is minimal so as 
to prevent any changes in battery usage and CPU processor cycles visible to the users. It 
was designed to gain root privileges on infected mobiles and install a second application 
to steal sensitive information and protect itself from removal. 
Ikee.B: 
Ikee.B is one of the advanced botnets in smartphones due to its infection mechanism. It 
targets jail broken iPhones and when it infects a smartphone, it scans the IP range of 
iPhone networks, looking for other vulnerable iPhones in global scale. 
 
3.3 Next Generation Botnets in Smartphones 
Design of these next generation botnets involves designing a stealthy command & Control 
channel, making detection harder and prevent botnet hijacking and take down of botnet as 
hard as possible even in case of complete reverse engineering of the bot and control of 
critical resources by the defenders trying to hijack or take down the botnet.  These next 
generation botnets involve leveraging Online Social Networks or public blog services as 
the Command & Control channel to disseminate commands. Since, these Online Social 
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Networks and public blog services are neither monetarily inhibiting nor require any kind 
of identity to be provided and is hard to monitor, they can be effectively used as Command 
& Control channels. Another advantage of using these channels as C&C channels is 
camouflage. It is difficult to detect the traffic of these platforms as Command & Control 
channel traffic due to their pervasiveness and popularity.    
In order to counter this type of botnets, we ought to develop the mitigating strategies that 
try to take down the botnet at its lowest level, individual bot. Taking down a botnet has 
involved finding the source of Command & Control channel and trying to cut off the 
Command & Control channel, thus isolation the individual bots without any means of 
connection with the bot master to accept the commands and thus do any nefarious activities. 
But this approach might not work with these next generation botnets whose Command & 
Control channel might be impossible to take down. Generally, large ISP s try to identify 
the Command & Control channel traffic in the total traffic that passes through them by 
various means. Many researchers have proposed various mechanisms that try to detect 
anomalous traffic of Command & Control in normal traffic [13]. These methods involve 
clustering of similar type of traffic which might be anomalous in nature with respected to 
general traffic.  So, instead of looking at the source of Command & Control channel to take 
down or hijack the botnet, we look to the existence of bots in the devices.  
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Chapter 4 
 
           METHODOLOGY 
 
In this chapter, we discuss the design details of a next generation botnet, our approach to 
detect such bots and our implementation details regarding the prototype of such bot and 
our method.  
 
4.1 Design of Next Generation Botnet 
Our next generation botnet design details are as follows. The bot uses centralized C&C 
topology. The bot contains a hard coded public key and a Username Generation Algorithm 
[14]. This Username Generation Algorithm is derived from the Domain Generation 
Algorithm mentioned above. In the domain flux, Domain Generation Algorithm takes a 
seed (system date and/or time) and generates a list of domains and the bot attempts to 
connect to each one of them until it connects to a domain. Once it is connected to a domain, 
it downloads the latest commands and tries to verify their authenticity using the public key 
hardcoded in it. Username Generation Algorithm differs slightly from it. Username 
Generation Algorithm generates a number of random names which are appended to a list 
of Online Social networks, blog posts. For example, let us consider “Werdhfljcm” is one 
of the names outputted by the Username Generation Algorithm. This username is now 
appended to a list of Social Online Networks. Let us consider that list of social networks 
contain 1. www.facebook.com 2. www.twitter.com 3. www.baidu.com etc.  Now, the bot 
appends the username to all these sites resulting in 3 possible candidates for 
communication. 1. www.facebook.com/Werdhfljcm 2. www.twitter.com/Werdhfljcm 3. 
www.Baidu.com/Werdhfljcm . The bot checks for presence of these users and if they exist, 
it will download the latest tweets (in case of twitter) or cover pictures or profile pictures 
(in case of Facebook) or posts (in case of Baidu). The important reason in downloading the 
specific information is that it is public. One does not need to login to obtain the above 
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mentioned information (tweets, cover/profile pictures, posts) from the Online Social 
Networks or blog posts. After downloading this publicly available information from the 
user profile of one of the users from the list of users generated by Username Generation 
Algorithm from one of the Online Social Networks or blogs, the bot proceeds to 
authenticate the information through the means of the hard coded public key. It is obvious 
in the case of tweets and posts. In case of pictures, attackers leverage the concept of 
“Steganography” in hiding the commands in the pictures. Once, the command is 
authenticated, the bot proceeds to execute the instruction. If the command needs the data 
to be uploaded, it then can include the instructions for the upload. 
The bot master who created the bot needs to create just one user in the users list generated 
by the Username Generation Algorithm in one of the social networks, and post the 
commands in that user publicly available information signed with his/her private key.  
 
4.2 Prototype 
 Our implementation of this next generation bot involves only one Online Social Network 
(OSN), Twitter. Our username generation algorithm is derived from the following Domain 
name Generation Algorithm (DGA). 
for i in range(16): 
        year = ((year ^ 8 * year) >> 11) ^ ((year & 0xFFFFFFF0) << 17) 
        month = ((month ^ 4 * month) >> 25) ^ 16 * (month & 0xFFFFFFF8) 
        day = ((day ^ (day << 13)) >> 19) ^ ((day & 0xFFFFFFFE) << 12) 
        domain += chr(((year ^ month ^ day) % 25) + 97) 
  
    return username 
Pseudo code for Username Generation Algorithm [15] 
The bot will append the usernames generated by this algorithm to the OSN (in our case 
www.twitter.com/) and checks the OSN for the existence of the user (of username 
generated by DGA) and if user exists, the bot retrieves the first tweet of the user and 
authenticates the tweet using the public key hardcoded in the bot. 
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Chapter 5 
 
         DETECTION MECHANISM 
 
Our detection mechanism of the above mentioned type next generation bot in the 
smartphone platform involves modelling the user web behavior and detecting any 
anomalies that might be caused by the presence of the bot. This detection mechanism 
involves collecting the user traffic (training data) for a certain amount of time (training 
time), modelling the user behavior based on the traffic collected using a classifier and then 
comparing the traffic generated on the subsequent days to the model already constructed 
on the user behavior. If the traffic does not match with the model already constructed above 
a threshold, the user will be notified of the anomalous traffic. If the user approves the traffic 
then this traffic will be considered as benign traffic and will be used to update the model.  
User data collection: 
We have considered two modes of traffic collection. One of them is the application level 
proxy and the other one being the “SSL hooking”. At the end we chose Application Level 
proxy. The reasons for choosing Application Level proxy and not SSL hooking are detailed 
below. 
SSL Hooking: 
SSL in android is implemented using OpenSSL library. OpenSSL is a open source toolkit 
to implement SSL version. Android makes calls to the OpenSSL library functions to 
implement SSL. SSL implementation in android works as follows. Suppose a browser 
executes HTTPS request for www.google.com. In order to encrypt the data (i.e. ,  
www.google.com), the “ssl_write” function of the OpenSSL library is called. The data 
www.google.com is written to memory and the pointer to that memory is passed to the “ssl 
write” along with the key negotiated by the protocol and the mode of encryption to be used. 
During the decryption process, similar method is followed. The encrypted version of the 
data will be written to a memory location and the library method “ssl_read” will be called 
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with this memory pointer and the respective key. The “ssl_read” will decrypt the data. So, 
“SSL hooking” involves hooking the calls to “ssl_read” and/or “ssl_write” functions to 
read/write the data when it is in clear text.   
Run time hooking in windows involves hooking DLL files through various means such as 
IDT/SSDT hooking. Hooking function calls in Linux is normally done through the 
“LD_PRELOAD” function. This “LD_PRELOAD” instructs the .so (shared object) files 
to be loaded from the path “LD_PRELOAD” points to before loading any library. So, if 
LD_PRELOAD were to point to a directory containing our version of “ssl_read” and/or 
“ssl_write”, our “ssl_read” and/or “ssl_write” will be executed instead of original 
functions. Our functions can copy the clear text data and then redirect to the original 
functions which will perform the intended duty. 
According to our knowledge, “SSL hooking” on android involves either building a custom 
rom or repackaging the applications which are installed on the smartphone. This is due to 
the fact that Android Operating System does not include “LD_PRELOAD” function. 
Although Android OS is derived from Linux, many parts of Linux are stripped away to 
reduce the size of the Operating System. “LD_PRELOAD” is one of them. 
We tried to hook the android .so files without repackaging the individual applications 
and/or without building a custom ROM. But, the Android Operating System would not 
permit any such hooking as it is viewed as a potential breach. And, the data collected by 
our ssl_read/ssl_write functions will be huge. And also, the Application proxy provides us 
with a variety of information which we can make use of when trying to model the user web 
behavior. So, we used an Application Proxy (Fiddler) to collect the data from the user. This 
can be done by modifying the network connection settings of a particular network in the 
Android settings. Application proxy also intercepts HTTPS traffic by installing a root 
certificate in Android’s system trusted store. 
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5.1 Modelling the User Behavior 
We extract some metrics from the user data to model the user behavior. The metrics are  
1. Hostname 
2. Application name 
3. Language encoding 
4. Randomness of the request (entropy) 
5. Top Level Domain (TLD) 
6. Time of the request 
We design the features for our classifier based on the above metrics.  
Our modelling mechanism involves two phases. First phase involves modelling the 
semantics of the user web usage. It consists of first dividing the user requests on per domain 
basis. For every domain, we keep track of the requests made to that particular domain. We 
construct a separate model for each domain based on the user behavior. After getting the 
test data from each user, we divide the data based on domain and create models for each 
domain. In the testing phase, we divide the test data based on the domain name and match 
each domain traffic with the model constructed for that domain during the training phase 
and assign anomaly weights based on the level of matching. We do this for all the domains. 
Second phase involves calculating the frequency of requests made per domain per day 
by the user. During the training phase, we keep track of the time of requests. We divide the 
day into 24 cycles. We calculate the number of requests made to a domain per cycle and 
the total number of requests made to a domain per day. We calculate this frequency of 
traffic per domain for all the days during the training phase and construct a model based 
on the frequency of the traffic. During the testing phase, we compare the frequency of the 
traffic per domain per cycle to the already constructed model and assign an anomaly weight 
to the extent of matching.  
Finally, we sum both the anomaly scores and if the total score crosses a threshold, then 
the domain traffic will be reported to the user along with the apps that are making the 
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requests to the domain. The user will be prompted to classify the traffic as benign or 
malicious. If the traffic is classified as benign, then it is used to update the model. 
The features used above are very useful in detecting the bot traffic. The significance of 
each feature is explained below 
 Host name: host name is used to separate the traffic directed at a particular host 
from others. This is useful in particular because the bot generates anomalous traffic 
(C&C traffic) to different domains. These domains are identified by the host name.  
 Application name: This is a very useful particularly in smart phones. In 
smartphones, each application will be mostly associated with a domain (in other 
words, host name). For example, almost all the traffic generated to New York 
Times (www.nytimes.com) will come from the New York Times application 
installed on the smartphone. This association of the domain name with the 
application is useful to differentiate traffic from other applications to this domain. 
While it is not always true that majority of the traffic to a domain will come from a 
application, it is true in majority of the cases. 
 Language encoding: It is a very useful feature along with the Top Level Domain 
feature to differentiate the domains based on geography. When a language encoding 
for requests directed to a particular domain changes, it might be because of a change 
in the user preference of language or anomalous traffic (bot C&C traffic). This 
feature along with the TLD feature can be used to model the geography of the 
domain. 
 Randomness: This feature is calculated based on Shannon entropy of English 
words. Since the user requests made by the bot are random in nature due to the 
Domain name Generation Algorithm used to craft the user names, the randomness 
of these requests will be more than general requests. For example, if user normally 
requests users like www.twitter.com/BarackObama and suddenly start making 
requests like www.twitter.com/snsaUe43Ksak, the randomness changes. We 
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consider two randomness features. Randomness of the string immediate next to the 
host name and the randomness of the whole user request. Both these will help 
capture the normal entropy of the user and thus differentiate anomalous traffic from 
general usage. 
 Top Level Domain (TLD): Top Level Domains like .com, .net, .org etc., help us 
model the user behavior more accurately based on the kinds of the domain he/she 
is visiting. IF the user traffic contains .com or .net normally and suddenly .in or .cn 
or .ru starts appearing in the user traffic, then it is an indication of the anomaly. 
This might be due to change in user behavior or presence of bot.  
 Time of the request: Time is one of the very important metric due to the fact that 
bot checks for the presence of the user before retrieving his first tweet and 
authenticating it. This check for the presence of the user will generate a traffic that 
will be almost anomalous because it varies with user traffic in frequency at that 
moment in time and also for the whole day. By carefully modelling this anomaly, 
we have a greater chance of predicting the bot traffic.  
 
The frequency of the requests collected for every hour per domain will help in detection of 
the bot even if it employs Time space randomization. The bot which employs time space 
randomization will not make all the requests at one instance. Instead, it will space the 
requests to C&C server through the time so that any metric which is trying to catch the bot 
based on Time based similarity will fail. Our model of calculating frequencies of the traffic 
for every hour will detect the bot even if it employs Time space randomization. Our method 
is useful even in the case of a bot that employs a dynamic Username Generation Algorithm. 
A dynamic Username Generation Algorithm does not construct the usernames based on 
static seed values like date and/or time. A dynamic Username Generation Algorithm will 
make use of changing seed values like “trending topics in twitter”, “top searches in 
google”. This kind of algorithm is more powerful because it is immune to reverse 
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engineering. If the bot does not emply dynamic UGA, and if someone reverse engineers 
the malware (bot) and found the UGA, it is possibly to disrupt the botnet by registering all 
those usernames in advance. Even though it is time consuming and tedious, it can still be 
done. However, a bot employing UGA is not susceptible to reverse engineering because its 
UGA takes seed values that change constantly over time. Twitter trending topics change 
frequently and so does the top google searches. Our method of detection works for the bots 
that employ dynamic UGA because we are bot dependent on the type of UGA used for the 
generating usernames. As long as the traffic is anomalous, our method will try to 
differentiate it.  
 
5.2 Evaluation 
Our evaluation consists of traffic collected from two users. Our training period consists of 
15 days. All the subsequent days are considered as testing data. We train the classifier 
(Kernel Logistic Regression) based on the data of these two users for a period of 15 days. 
One user is given a Samsung Galaxy Nexus and the other user is given a LG Nexus 4. Both 
the smartphones are new and are installed with the Application Proxy before given to the 
users. The users are Graduate students from Arizona State University. No restrictions are 
placed on the usage of the smartphones. The users are encouraged to use the smartphones 
normally. The smartphones are assumed to be clean of any malware for the first 15 days of 
usage. The application proxy redirects the traffic to the designated server before returning 
the results to the smartphones. The server is a Intel core i5 dual core machine with 8 GB 
RAM. The server collects the data from the smartphones and is responsible for building 
the usage models using Kernel Logistic Regression classifier after 15 days. 
The data collected over 15 days for each user is about 120 MB each. There are 156 unique 
domains being accessed by user 1 and 128 unique domains being accessed by user 2. After 
the 15 day training period, one of the smartphones is infected with the prototype bot and 
the traffic is collected and compared to the existing models built on the training data. 
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5.3 Results 
 The Kernel Logistic Regression classifier is used for training and testing of the user 
models. As mentioned above, the usage of the user is modelled as distinct phases. One of 
which is used for capturing the semantics of user requests and one for the timing and 
frequency of the requests. The user requests are divided on per domain basis and the kernel 
logistic regression classifier is used to train the model of the users on per domain basis in 
these phases. The training data consists of traffic from the users without any infection. 
Next, the prototype bot is injected into the smartphones and it is configured to try out 100, 
50 and 25 usernames per day respectively for 3 days. The traffic of these 3 days is 
considered as 3 different samples of test data and is inputted to the models already trained 
individually.  
When the bot made 25 UGA generated requests per day, our classifier returned a mismatch 
of 56.6% for phase I and a mismatch of 59.3 % for the phase II for the domains associated 
with the UGA. When the bot made 50 UGA generated requests per day, our classifier 
returned a mismatch of 59 % for Phase I and 65.4 % for Phase II. When the bot made 100 
UGA requests per day, our classifier returned 63 % mismatch for Phase I and 78.8 % 
mismatch for Phase II. 
Based on our observations, when the threshold match is set for 55 % for Phase I and 59 % 
for Phase II, the domains associated with the bot traffic will be reported as mismatch for 
99 % of the time. The test data for each day consists of almost 500 requests made per day 
including the bot generated traffic. 
The advantage of our method is less number of false positives. Since, we attempt to 
estimate the mismatch threshold and not the match threshold, we achieved almost zero rate 
of false positives. This might lead the system to believe that some requests of the bot as 
benign but since the bot make much more requests than one, the model is bound to catch 
one of them and report to the user. 
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Chapter 6 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
6.1 Overview 
This chapter includes the research efforts discussed in this thesis. The following sections 
discuss the significance of the work done and recommendations for the future work. 
 
6.2 Significance of Research 
Smartphone malware is one of lucrative and dangerous phenomenon in current cyber space. 
Among them, botnets are one of the widely deployed malware due to the dynamic nature 
of their use. Advanced botnets targeting Online Social Networks are in particular malicious 
because of their resilience to botnet take downs.  
This research provides a framework to detect the bots present in the smartphones 
leveraging Online Social Networks as Command & Control channel. The detection is based 
upon modelling the user’s web usage patterns and detecting any anomalous traffic that fall 
outside normal user web usage. This research develops a prototype bot of the above type 
and identifies the features needed to model the user behavior. 
This research extends the work of detection of bots in the smartphones by successfully 
modelling the user behavior in web and detecting anomalous traffic. 
 
6.3 Recommendations for Future Research 
The design and proof of concept are the first steps towards detection of advanced bots in 
the smartphone domain. The future research to improve the proposed approach can be as 
follows: 
1. Eliminate the central server. Collect and model the user data in the smartphone. This is 
possible due to the hardware improvements being done to the smartphones these days. 
Almost all the smartphones have dual cores and at least 1 GB of RAM. The energy 
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consumption can be made negligible by building and updating the model when the 
phone is plugged in for long durations. This will reduce the reliance upon the central 
server and allays the privacy concerns of the individual users. 
2. Continuous learning: Continuous learning mechanism can be implemented which 
instead of training a model and testing the data against it and updating the model 
periodically with the users data, will update the model for every request user makes, 
benign or malign.  
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